Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?

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Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court held that arbitration provisions contained in brokerage customers’ agreements were enforceable with respect to federal securities claims, proposals have been floated to include in an issuer’s governance documents a provision that would require arbitration of investors’ claims against the issuer. To date, however, publicly traded domestic issuers and their counsel have not seriously pursued these proposals, probably because of several legal obstacles to implementation. In addition to these legal obstacles, publicly traded issuers may not have perceived significant advantages to arbitration. Recent legal developments, however, make inclusion of an arbitration provision in a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents a proposal worthy of serious consideration. In particular, because of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, issuers may be able to achieve an advantage through adoption of an arbitration provision in their governance documents that they were not able to achieve through PSLRA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. They could finally achieve the demise of securities class claims!

I. Introduction

Arbitration of investors’ claims against issuers is “an idea whose time has come” for over twenty years, ever since the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon1 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,2 overturned long-standing precedent and held that arbitration provisions contained in brokerage customers’ agreements were enforceable with respect to federal securities claims. After these decisions, as arbitration before the SRO forums became the customary method of resolving disputes between individual investors and brokerage

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firms, some academics and practitioners suggested the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve investors’ claims against publicly traded issuers. Proposals were floated to include in an issuer’s governance documents a provision that would require arbitration of investors’ claims against the issuer. A second round of proposals was advanced in the post-Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) deregulatory climate.

All proponents emphasized the traditional benefits of arbitration, *i.e.*, a faster, less expensive, more flexible dispute resolution process by arbitrators possessing expertise in the subject matter. Many also advocated for arbitration as an antidote to perceived abuses of federal securities class actions.

To date, however, publicly traded domestic issuers and their counsel have not seriously pursued these proposals, probably because of several legal obstacles to implementation. First, there is doubt about the legality and enforceability under state corporate law of an arbitration provision contained in an issuer’s governance documents. Second, there is also doubt whether such a provision is a commercial contract enforceable

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5 All those in note 4 except Professor Ramirez, who advocated arbitration because of the obstacles created by PSLRA.

6 See infra notes and accompanying text.
under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) §2. Third, the SEC has never repudiated its staff position that an arbitration provision in a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents would violate Securities Act §14 8 and Securities Exchange Act §29(a), 9 the anti-waiver provisions. 10

In addition to these legal obstacles, publicly traded issuers may not have perceived significant advantages to arbitration. Indeed, with respect to high-stakes “bet the company” disputes, such as securities class actions, litigation may be preferable because the very narrow grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards may make the risk of an aberrational arbitration award unacceptably high. 11 In addition, specifically with respect to federal securities claims, PSLRA imposes significant obstacles on plaintiffs in order to achieve the statute’s twin goals of “curb[ing] frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.” 12 As a result, it was hard to see how relocating federal securities fraud claims to a more flexible, less law-oriented arbitration forum would provide any advantages to corporate defendants. Finally, issuers could expect that adoption of an arbitration provision would expose them to criticism from investor advocates and negative publicity. 13 Taking into account all these factors, an issuer and its counsel were, at least until recently, likely to conclude that the costs of attempting to adopt an arbitration provision outweighed any

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7 See infra notes and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes and accompanying text.
13 Shearson was generally viewed as an anti-investor decision, and investors’ advocates urged Congress to enact legislation to overturn the result. See, e.g., McMahon Decision Should be Overturned to Protect Investors, House Panel Told, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 492 (Mar. 31, 1988). That negative perception continues, as the press frequently expresses negative views on customer arbitration, see Jill Gross and Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 397 (2008).
likely benefits. Accordingly, few publicly traded domestic issuers took the bold step of adopting arbitration provisions in their governance documents.

Recent legal developments, however, make inclusion of an arbitration provision in a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents a proposal worthy of serious consideration. First, while there continues to be legal uncertainty about the legality and enforceability of arbitration provisions contained in corporate governance documents, a recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion suggests that certificates of incorporation of publicly traded Delaware corporations could include arbitration clauses that would bind shareholders at least with respect to state fiduciary duty claims.14 Second, it is possible that if Delaware courts find an arbitration provision unenforceable, other courts could find the provision enforceable under the FAA, which would preempt the state law.15 Third, the SEC may find it difficult to maintain its opposition to arbitration provisions in governance documents in light of the fact that a number of foreign private issuers whose securities are traded in the U.S. have such provisions in their governance documents.16

Finally, the Supreme Court recently upheld, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,17 a provision in a consumer contract that disallowed class arbitration because the FAA preempted California precedent striking down class arbitration waivers as unconscionable.18 In light of Concepcion, issuers may be able to achieve an advantage through adoption of an arbitration provision in their governance documents that they

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14 See infra notes and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes and accompanying text.
were not able to achieve through PSLRA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.\textsuperscript{19} They could finally achieve the demise of securities class claims!

Part II discusses the erosion of the legal obstacles that discouraged publicly traded issuers from adopting arbitration provisions in governance documents. Part III compares litigation and arbitration options from the perspective of corporate defendants and shows that, at least until recently, they were likely to prefer litigation. Part IV addresses the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions on class arbitration and, in particular, the “game-changer,” \textit{Concepcion}.	extsuperscript{20} Part V considers the implications of \textit{Concepcion} and the impact on investors if class actions against publicly traded issuers are eliminated. Part VI concludes.

\section*{II. Legal Obstacles Are Eroding}

\subsection*{A. Legality and Enforceability under State Corporate Law}

There is considerable uncertainty under state corporate law\textsuperscript{21} about the legality and enforceability of arbitration provisions contained in a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents.\textsuperscript{22} While modern corporation statutes allow great flexibility and private ordering, the discretion of corporate managers and shareholders to limit shareholders’ powers cannot “achieve a result forbidden by settled rules of public policy.”\textsuperscript{23} For that reason it is unlikely that, absent legislative authorization, corporations could amend their certificates of incorporation to eliminate directors’ fiduciary

\textsuperscript{19} The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) amends SEA § 28(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb, to confer on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over most securities class actions, because of Congressional belief that plaintiffs’ attorneys could avoid the PSLRA obstacles by bringing class actions in state courts. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006).
\textsuperscript{20} 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
\textsuperscript{21} I previously reviewed the legal arguments in Barbara Black, \textit{Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar}, 2009 COLO. BUS. L. REV. 802, 838-842.
\textsuperscript{22} Arbitration of shareholders’ disputes in closely held corporations has long been generally accepted, but in those instances the arbitration clause is typically found in a shareholders’ agreement. \textit{Id}. 843.
\textsuperscript{23} Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952).
obligations. As another example, a 1926 Delaware Supreme Court opinion struck down a charter provision that gave a board of directors the power to deny a stockholder the right to inspect books and records. Unfortunately, there is very little recent case law addressing when this amorphous “public policy” standard has been violated.

Further, even if an arbitration provision adopted by all shareholders would be deemed legal under state law, there is a serious question of fairness about taking away rights from current shareholders that do not assent to the provision. While it is true that modern corporate law, with its emphasis on flexibility and adaptability to change, allows substantial alteration, even elimination, of shareholders’ rights without their consent, the power of shareholders holding a majority of the vote to alter corporate governance and stock ownership rules is not absolute. Thus, for example, majority shareholders cannot adopt an amendment to eliminate the board of directors, because that would deprive minority shareholders of the protections afforded by a board of directors with fiduciary responsibilities to the corporation. Similarly, although restrictions on transferability can be found in corporate governance documents, they are not binding on current shareholders that do not assent to the restrictions. Providing appraisal rights to shareholders if they dissent from the adoption of an arbitration provision may help to alleviate fairness concerns.

24 There is a contrary position. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 28-30, 67-68 (1990) (discussing fiduciary duties as “simply one of many drafting alternatives,” a default that can be altered or abandoned in the corporate contract without statutory permission). For a more general advocacy of the contractual nature of corporations, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).

25 State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 259-60 (Del. 1926).

26 In Delaware a statutorily defined “close corporation” may provide for management by the shareholders if all the incorporators or shareholders agree to it and notice of the provision is conspicuously noted on the stock certificate. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2011). See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. §7.32 (1984) (a similar provision under which the agreement ceases to be effective when the corporation becomes public).

Finally, assuming that an arbitration provision does not violate public policy and current shareholders that dissent from the provision are treated fairly, there is the question of whether the provision is enforceable as to subsequent stockowners. Courts routinely state that charter provisions are binding on all shareholders, including subsequent purchasers, in the context of customary corporate governance provisions and changes in the terms of the shares. But again, this principle is not without limits. Some changes so fundamentally alter the corporate governance structure or the shareholders’ property rights that they are limited to closely held corporations or require special protections for subsequent shareholders. Arbitration proponents assert that notice on the corporation’s website and in its SEC filings would be sufficient to bind future owners, and since plaintiffs in securities fraud actions will likely rely on the fraud on the market (FOTM) presumption in lieu to actual reliance, it may be inconsistent for them to argue that a public notice cannot bind them. Nevertheless, the issue remains unsettled.

The foregoing summary is not intended to answer definitively whether arbitration provisions in governance documents of publicly traded issuers are legal and enforceable under state corporate law. Rather, it makes the point that because of the considerable uncertainty as to these issues, publicly traded issuers and their counsel would be hesitant

30 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 351 (2011) (provision eliminating the board of directors is available only to statutorily defined close corporations, all shareholders must approve the amendment, and there must be conspicuously notice on stock certificate); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151 (2011) (restrictions on transferability of shares are binding on subsequent shareholders if there is conspicuous notice on the stock certificate or, in the case of uncertificated shares, it is contained in the required notice).
31 Bartlett, supra note XX, at 105.
32 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 225 (1988), adopted the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance so long as securities are traded in an efficient market. As a result, plaintiffs do not have to establish individual reliance on fraudulent statements.
to put forward for shareholder vote an arbitration provision unless its benefits make it worth the costs of implementing it.

A recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion, In re Revlon Inc. Shareholder Litigation, however, changes the equation and suggests that certificates of incorporation of publicly traded Delaware corporations could include an arbitration clause that would bind shareholders at least with respect to state fiduciary duty claims. Revlon is an instance of greater judicial scrutiny of those plaintiffs’ attorneys whom the Delaware judiciary has dubbed “frequent filers,” in which Chancellor Laster granted a motion to replace the original lead counsel because of counsel’s failure to advocate on behalf of the class and lack of candor to the tribunal. In the opinion the Chancellor acknowledged that greater oversight by the Delaware Chancery could lead to plaintiffs’ counsel filing in other jurisdictions and stated:

If they do, and if boards of directors and shareholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.

Nevertheless, Chancellor Laster indicated limits on this power:

I can envision that the Delaware courts would retain some measure of inherent residual authority so that entities created under the authority of Delaware law could not wholly exempt themselves from Delaware oversight. The issues

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34 Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960-61.
35 Revlon, 990 A.2d 940.
implicated by an exclusive forum selection provision must await resolution in an appropriate case.\textsuperscript{36}

After \textit{Revlon}, a few Delaware corporations have amended their governance documents to provide that Delaware is the exclusive forum for intra-corporate litigation.\textsuperscript{37} Although a California federal district court held that a bylaw adopted by the Oracle board of directors specifying Delaware as the exclusive forum was not enforceable at least with respect to those who were shareholders prior to its adoption, the court acknowledged that “were a majority of shareholders to approve such a charter amendment, the arguments for treating the venue provision like those in commercial contracts would be much stronger, even in the case of a plaintiff shareholder who had personally voted against the amendment.”\textsuperscript{38}

The Supreme Court has described predispute arbitration agreements as a form of forum selection clause.\textsuperscript{39} Accordingly, \textit{Revlon} may provide encouragement to a publicly traded corporation that wishes to adopt an arbitration provision in its governance documents. The Delaware judiciary’s reaction to an arbitration provision that would largely remove fiduciary obligation litigation from judicial oversight, however, may well be different from its reaction to a clause that would specify the Delaware courts as the sole forum for fiduciary obligation litigation. The former raises the policy question that

\textsuperscript{36} 990 A.2d at 960 note 8.
\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 255 note 11. \textit{See also} 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469-70 (2009) (requiring arbitration of ADEA claims is not a waiver of the statutory claims).
Chancellor Laster identified as the extent to which Delaware corporations can “exempt themselves from Delaware oversight.” Such an arbitration provision may be a “bridge too far” for the Delaware judiciary. If that should prove to be the case, then the courts, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, would have to address whether the arbitration provision was contained in a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” under FAA § 2 so that the Delaware judiciary’s refusal to enforce it is impermissible anti-arbitration animus. We turn next to this question.

B. What Constitutes a Commercial Contract under FAA § 2

The FAA’s primary purpose is “ensuring that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms”; to that end, the FAA preempts state law that exhibits anti-arbitration bias. If a publicly traded issuer’s governance documents constitute a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” under FAA § 2, then courts would have to enforce an arbitration provision in those documents notwithstanding contrary state law. The prerequisite for invoking this federal pro-arbitration policy, however, is an agreement to arbitrate, because “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent.”

40 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960, note 8 (Del. Ch. 2010).
43 Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (“the proper inquiry here should focus . . . on this question: Would the application of [state law] undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 681; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
47 Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2857 (internal quotation marks omitted).
law principles that govern the formation of contracts in deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate.\textsuperscript{49}

It is black letter law that the formation of a contract requires manifestation of mutual assent.\textsuperscript{50} There has been considerable litigation over assent to arbitration in several recurring fact patterns where a document containing a purported arbitration agreement is made available (either physically or online) to an individual who then takes some action consistent with contract performance,\textsuperscript{51} as by keeping the computer,\textsuperscript{52} continuing employment,\textsuperscript{53} or downloading software.\textsuperscript{54} While the opinions reach different answers that may depend on specific factual issues,\textsuperscript{55} important factors are whether the individual received actual notice of the existence of the terms in sufficient time to renounce the transaction and whether he took action that could constitute acceptance.\textsuperscript{56} It is not clear whether notice in the corporation’s SEC filings and on its corporate website would be sufficient notice, and whether continuing to hold securities would be sufficient action, to manifest assent. While it may present practical difficulties, it is possible for publicly traded issuers to deliver to shareholders a copy of the governance document

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id. But see} John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964) (finding that federal labor law was controlling because “a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract”).
\textsuperscript{50} Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 3 (agreement defined), 18 (manifestation of mutual assent) (1979); \textit{see also} e.g., Rodgers v. Erickson Air-Crane Co. LLC, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 259, at *20 (stating that “mutual assent is essential to the formation of … contracts.”); Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that “An essential element of any contract is the consent of the parties, or mutual assent”).
\textsuperscript{51} Stephen J. Ware, \textsc{Principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution} § 2.22(b) (2d ed. 2007) (describing recurrent fact patterns and citing cases).
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{E.g.}, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{E.g.}, Hardin v. First Cash Finan. Services, Inc., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006).
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{E.g.}, Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
\textsuperscript{55} The sufficiency of notice also depends on the extent to which the document resembles a traditional contract; \textit{see, e.g.}, Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 214 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding no agreement to arbitrate because the form did not look like a contract).
containing an arbitration provision by including it, for example, in the proxy statement for the annual meeting of shareholders, and it can be argued that shareholders that continue to hold their shares after receiving the notice would be bound by the arbitration provision. The countervailing argument, that merely continuing to hold the shares after receiving notice is not the manifestation of assent required under contract law, is also supportable.

State corporate law frequently refers to a corporation’s governance documents as a contract with the state and with the shareholders. An issue rarely addressed in the case law is whether this judicial notion of a contract in the context of resolving corporate governance issues, should be deemed the equivalent of a commercial contract under FAA § 2. Arbitration of shareholders’ disputes in closely held corporations has long been generally accepted, but, while the arbitration provision may also be included in the governance documents, the arbitration clause is typically found in an actual agreement entered into by all the shareholders. A recent Third Circuit opinion, applying Pennsylvania law, refused to enforce an arbitration provision contained in the bylaws of a professional corporation (a law firm) against a lawyer-shareholder in the absence of

57 Support for the argument that notice on the corporation’s website is sufficient can be found in the auction cases where because of the special nature of auctions, the law imposes a greater responsibility on bidders to ascertain the terms of the sale; see Hessel v. Christie’s Inc., 399 F. Supp.2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). I discuss these cases in Black, supra note XX [Under the Radar], at 849-50.
59 The metaphor goes back at least to Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
60 See, e.g., STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130 , 1136 (Del. 1991).
62 Id. at 528, note 80.
evidence that she assented to it.\(^63\) The plaintiff specifically averred that she was never provided a copy of the bylaws, was never informed of the existence of the arbitration provision in the bylaws, and never signed any document that referred to the arbitration provision. To counter this, the law firm argued that as a director, she had constructive notice of the terms of the bylaws, but the court was not persuaded. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to address the “tension between corporate law principles and arbitration contract principles,”\(^64\) the Third Circuit determined that because the plaintiff did not receive a copy of the bylaws containing the arbitration provision, she could not have agreed to arbitrate. Note that the Third Circuit stated that there cannot be assent to arbitration without receipt of the arbitration agreement; it does not state that receipt of the arbitration provision, without more, would constitute the requisite manifestation of assent.\(^65\) If an affirmative act of acceptance is required, possibly a shareholders’ vote on the management proxy card would suffice, although there remains the issue of whether non-assenting shareholders would be bound.\(^66\)

The uncertainty under both state corporate and contract law could lead to different outcomes in different jurisdictions. Indeed, it could lead to an unprecedented show-down between the current Supreme Court, which is generally considered to be “pro-business,” and the Delaware judiciary, which is widely praised for its business acumen. Moreover,


\(^{64}\) 560 F.3d at 158.

\(^{65}\) See Bratek v. L&L Fin. Holdings, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46598 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010) (holding that an arbitration provision on a warrant was not enforceable because investor never manifested assent to be bound).

\(^{66}\) Galaviz v. Berg, discussed supra note and accompanying text, also recognized the tension between corporate and contract law principles when it found no mutual assent, at least with respect to preexisting shareholders, when a forum selection bylaw was adopted by directors, but stated that the argument for treating it like a commercial contract would be stronger if it had been adopted by a majority vote of the shareholders.
even if the arbitration provision is determined to be legal and enforceable under corporate or contract law, the legal battle may not be over for a publicly traded issuer wishing to adopt such a provision. Federal courts may determine that the arbitration provision is invalid, with respect to federal securities claims, because it violates the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws. We turn next to this issue.

C. SEC Staff's Position on Arbitration Provisions in Governance Documents

Securities Act § 1467 and Securities Exchange Act § 29(a)68 (the anti-waiver statutes) invalidate “any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with” the federal securities statutes and their rules.69 In 1990, when a corporation that was planning its initial public offering sought to include an arbitration provision in its governance documents, the SEC staff objected to its inclusion.70 In its view, “it would be contrary to the public interest to require investors who want to participate in the nation’s equity markets to waive access to a judicial forum for vindication of federal or state law rights, where such a waiver is made through a corporate charter rather than through an individual investor’s decision.”71

Although there are differences between customer/broker and purchaser/issuer claims that provide a basis for distinguishing McMahon/Rodriguez, it is not likely that those differences would persuade courts that the latter type of claims could not be

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69 For the legislative history and leading cases analyzing these provisions, see Black, supra note XX [Under the Radar] at 824-828.
70 Both the attorney who represented the issuer and the attorney who was at the time Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, at the SEC wrote accounts of this incident, advocating for their respective positions. Schneider, supra note ; Thomas L. Riesenberg, Commentary Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A Reply to Carl W. Schneider, 8 INSIGHTS 2 (Aug. 1990).
71 Riesenberg, supra note , at 2.
brought in arbitration (assuming that the requisite agreement was present).\footnote{Black, supra note XX [Radar], at 828-832. I went on to argue that an arbitration provision with a class action waiver would violate the anti-waiver provisions; id. at 832-835. I address this infra notes and accompanying text.} Whatever the ultimate resolution of that legal issue, however, the SEC staff’s position presented a significant practical obstacle. An issuer that wanted to include an arbitration provision in its governance documents would have to work around the practical difficulties caused by the agency’s disapproval and suffer the consequences flowing from incurring the SEC staff’s disapproval.

There are signs that times have changed since 1990. Although the SEC has never publicly modified its staff position that arbitration clauses in corporate documents of publicly traded issuers are contrary to federal public policy, there were published reports in 2007 that the SEC, under the leadership of Chairman Christopher Cox, considered changing its policy.\footnote{Kara Scannell, SEC Explores Opening Door to Arbitration, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 2007, at A1; Nicholas Rummel, SEC and Congress gang up on arbitration, Fin. Week, July 23, 2007, available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070723/REG/70720028/1002/.} Moreover, some foreign private issuers whose securities trade in U.S. markets require arbitration of investors’ claims in their corporate governance documents\footnote{See, e.g., Articles of Association of Royal Dutch Shell plc, May 18, 2010, available at http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/rds/corporate_governance/rds_articles_of_association_18052010.doc; See also Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in Public Company Charters: An Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or a Descent into Hades?, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 371 (2007) (finding arbitration options or requirements in the charters, bylaws, or regional laws governing 40 companies trading in the United States).} or American Depositary Receipts [or Shares] (ADR) agreements.\footnote{See JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 167 Fed. Appx. 266 (2d Cir. 2006).} The best known is Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), incorporated under the laws of England and Wales, with its official residence in the Netherlands, whose ADR are traded on the NYSE. Its Articles of Association generally require that all disputes between shareholders and the company and/or its directors be exclusively resolved in The Hague under the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce\textsuperscript{76} and specifically includes all disputes arising under U.S. law, including securities laws.\textsuperscript{77}

Indeed, a few securities and breach of fiduciary duty class claims involving publicly traded domestic and foreign private issuers have been filed in the American Arbitration Association (AAA) forum.\textsuperscript{78} In a matter that received considerable publicity, Harvard University, the owner of ADR representing preferred shares of Surgut, a public oil and gas company organized under the laws of the Russian Federation, brought a purported class arbitration seeking money damages and declaratory relief for Surgut's alleged failure to pay the full amount of mandated dividends.\textsuperscript{79} An AAA arbitration panel (by a 2-1 vote, the arbitrator appointed by Surgut dissenting) construed the arbitration clause to permit class arbitration, and a federal district court confirmed this

\textsuperscript{78} The pleadings and any awards issued are available in its publicly available database. A review of the AAA class arbitration database conducted in fall 2010 identified six cases involving investment disputes and another four involving business disputes. Most originated as judicial actions in which defendants were successful in requiring arbitration in the AAA forum on the basis of an arbitration clause contained in an agreement. In four cases in which defendants challenged class arbitration, arbitration panels construed arbitration clauses that were silent on the question of class arbitration as permitting class arbitration. (Stolt-Nielsen, discussed infra notes and accompanying txt, will likely have an impact on this issue.) Derivative claims are not included in AAA database; therefore, it could not be determined if any have been filed. A few courts have ordered the arbitration of derivative claims brought by public shareholders of securities brokerage firms, but it is not clear that any of these arbitrations took place. See, e.g., In re Salomon Inc. S’holder Deriv. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P98,454 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1994) (NYSE refused to accept claim); Frederick v. First Union Secs., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 774, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (NYSE refused to accept; court thought that NASD might accept).
award. After an appeal to the Second Circuit was stayed, Harvard and Surgut stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of the arbitration.

Whatever the SEC’s current position on arbitration provisions in governance documents, if the SEC permits securities of foreign private issuers that have arbitration provisions in their governance documents to trade in the U.S. markets, it will be hard-pressed to justify its continued opposition to the use of such provisions by U.S. issuers. If there was a trend in this direction, however, it appears to have stalled. A review of approximately seventy issuers with operations in China that conducted IPOs in 2010 found that only one that explicitly stated that its articles of association required arbitration of disputes involving the Articles of Association or the applicable Business Companies law. Of nine FPIs that conducted IPOs in 2011, as of March 2, 2011, none stated that that it required arbitration. A number of issuers explicitly stated that their corporate governance documents did not require arbitration, which at least hints that the SEC staff may have asked.

As Part II makes clear, a publicly traded issuer contemplating inclusion of an arbitration provision in its governance documents would have to take into account the legal uncertainties attendant to implementing such an action. These obstacles, however, are not necessarily insurmountable in the face of a determined campaign by a motivated issuer and its counsel. It is likely that publicly traded issuers have not seriously pursued any of the proposals that have been circulated over the past twenty years because they

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82 Data on file with author.
were not persuaded that there would be significant benefits to outweigh the considerable costs. Part III examines the arbitration and litigation options from the perspective of a corporate defendant to show that, at least until recently, litigation, and not arbitration, would be the preferred option.

III. Comparing Arbitration and Litigation: “High Stakes” Claims

From the perspective of a publicly traded issuer contemplating amendment of its governance documents to require arbitration of investors’ claims, the cost-benefit analysis of arbitration versus litigation is complex.\(^\text{83}\) Adopting an arbitration provision would certainly entail significant initial costs. Because litigation is the default rule and arbitration in this context is not customary, transaction costs would be incurred in drafting the arbitration provision, amending the corporate governance documents, and in all likelihood litigating challenges to the provision, at least until the issues of legality and enforceability were resolved. Adopting an arbitration clause may also cost a corporate defendant in terms of reputation and bad publicity, given a strong belief among many investors and their advocates that arbitration is unfair and biased toward businesses that are “repeat players.”\(^\text{84}\) The corporation may also experience a negative reaction from the SEC staff that could affect subsequent dealings with the agency. After the initial costs, arbitration entails some expenditures for the arbitration panel and forum that are not incurred in litigation.\(^\text{85}\) In the context of securities class actions and derivative claims, however, where other costs (principally, lawyers’ and experts’ fees) are high, these costs


\(^\text{85}\) Drahozal & Ware, supra note XX, at 447-49.
may not be a significant factor in the equation. Accordingly, arbitration would have to offer businesses meaningful advantages to warrant these additional costs.

What are the potential advantages of arbitration? According to Professors Christopher Drahozal and Stephen Ware, parties will pay the additional costs associated with arbitration when they expect it will provide them with a better process or a better outcome. Pertinent factors include: arbitration may be faster and cheaper, it may lessen the risk of an aberrational jury verdict, it may result in more accurate outcomes because of arbitrator expertise or application of trade rules, it may better protect confidential information. Others stress the parties’ control over the process. Types of disputes where businesses often prefer arbitration include routine, small-stakes contracts, transnational contracts, and situations where parties wish to maintain an ongoing relationship. Conversely, Professors Drahozal and Ware identify certain categories of cases where parties prefer litigation over arbitration. The most important for our purpose is high-stakes “bet the company” litigation, where the limited grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards may make the risk of an aberrational award unacceptably high.

Commercial arbitration providers concur with the academic perspective. Organizations that have as their mission the promotion of dispute resolution alternatives

87 Drahozal & Ware, supra note XX, at 451.
88 Id. at 451-52.
89 REPORT ON GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. COMPANIES 16-17.
92 Drahozal & Ware, supra note XX, at 452.
93 Id. at 454-56.
to litigation compile comparisons of arbitration and litigation. While they describe a number of advantages that arbitration has over litigation, they also describe the significant negative factor of arbitration in high-stakes litigation that should curb any corporate defendants’ enthusiasm for it: “award is final & binding; limited grounds to vacate or modify award.”

Securities class actions and derivative claims are paradigm cases of high-stakes disputes where corporate defendants fear an aberrational result imposing significant liability; hence meaningful judicial review is important. Accordingly, while arbitration may offer some advantages, the risks of high stakes will likely outweigh these advantages.

But what if publicly traded issuers could eliminate at least some high stakes dispute resolution? That would certainly change the cost-benefit analysis. We turn now to the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on class arbitration.

IV. Class Arbitration in the U.S. Supreme Court and The Game Changer – AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

Since its 2005 opinion, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the Supreme Court has effected a complete reversal in its position on “high stakes” arbitration,

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95 Advantages of arbitration that would be attractive to corporate defendants include the limited discovery production, the confidentiality of proceedings, and the parties’ ability to select arbitrators, often with special expertise. ADR Suitability Guide, supra note XX, at 30.

96 Id. at 30, 32.


culminating in its 2011 opinion in *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, the game changer that allows class action waivers in consumer arbitration.

In *Bazzle* a divided Court considered whether an arbitration clause in consumer lending contracts that was silent on the issue of class arbitration could be interpreted to permit it. Justice Breyer, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, stated that this was a state law issue of contract interpretation that, under the FAA, is decided by the arbitrator. The dissenting Justices, in contrast, interpreted the contract term giving the commercial lender the right to select an arbitrator for each dispute as precluding class arbitrations.

Courts and commentators interpreted *Bazzle* as authorizing arbitrators to permit class arbitrations so long as the arbitration agreement did not expressly prohibit it. In response to *Bazzle*, the AAA developed and implemented a set of rules to govern class arbitrations, which went into effect in October 2003, and as of September 2009, the AAA had administered 283 class actions under its class rules. Although most were consumer- or employment-related, there was a small number that involved corporate or securities matters or other complex business disputes.

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100 Justice Stevens would have affirmed the judgment below, seeing no need to remand, but because that would have meant that there was no controlling judgment of the Court, he concurred in the judgment.
101 *Green Tree*, 539 U.S. at 451. Justice Thomas wrote a one-paragraph dissent reiterating his consistent position that the FAA did not apply to proceedings in state courts. *Id.* at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105 *Id.* at 22.
106 *See supra* note and accompanying text.
Five years after *Bazzle*, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the permissibility of class arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue. In *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.*, a majority of the Justices held that the arbitrators exceeded their power under the FAA because they construed an arbitration clause in a shipping charter to permit class arbitration as a matter of public policy. The parties stipulated that the arbitration clause was silent with respect to class arbitration and that “[a]ll the parties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no agreement that has been reached on that issue.” In reaching its decision, the arbitration panel relied in part on the fact that other arbitrators had, post-*Bazzle*, construed a variety of arbitration clauses to permit class arbitration and that to rule otherwise “would leave ‘no basis for a class action absent express agreement among all parties and the putative class members.’”

In finding that the arbitration panel had exceeded its powers, Justice Alito, writing for the majority, made clear what he viewed as the essential hubris of the arbitration panel:

Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York law contains a “default rule” under which an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class arbitration in the absence of express consent, the panel proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation. Perceiving a post-*Bazzle* consensus among arbitrators that class arbitration is beneficial in “a wide variety of settings,” the panel considered only whether there was any good reason not to follow that consensus in this case. …. The conclusion is inescapable that the panel simply imposed its own conception of sound policy.

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107 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
108 The three dissenting Justices (Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer) argued that the issue was not ripe for judicial review, since this was a “partial award” that ruled only that the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. *Id.* at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109 *Id.* at 1766.
110 *Id.*
111 *Id.* at 1768-69.
The majority, moreover, did more than vacate the award; rather than remand to the arbitration panel, it went on to construe the arbitration clause as not permitting class arbitrations. Recognizing that this action appeared at variance with Bazzle, the majority took pains to narrow the import of that previous decision. Emphasizing repeatedly that the rationale of Justice Breyer’s opinion did not constitute the views of a majority of Justices,112 Justice Alito described Bazzle’s plurality opinion as addressing only one narrow question: that the arbitrators, and not the court, should decide whether a contract is “silent” on the question of class arbitration.113 It did not, according to Justice Alito, address the standard for determining whether an arbitration agreement allows class arbitration.114 In this discussion, Justice Alito raises the question of whether the permissibility of class arbitrations is more than a question of contract interpretation: “does the FAA entirely preclude class arbitration? Does the FAA permit class arbitration only under limited circumstances, such as when the contract expressly so provides? Or is this question left entirely to state law?”115 Leaving these questions unanswered, the majority held that “an implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration … is not a

112 Essentially, then, Bazzle established no precedent! See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Stipanowich on Stilt: Outcome Over Clarity (April 28), Apr. 28, 2010, at http://cpradr-staging.ibelong.com/Edit/News/tabid/45/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/587/Default.aspx (“It reminds me of the television show where a character woke up and discovered that the last couple of television seasons had all been a dream!”).

113 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772 (“Unfortunately, the opinions in Bazzle appear to have baffled the parties in this case at the time of the arbitration proceeding. For one thing, the parties appear to have believed that the judgment in Bazzle requires an arbitrator, not a court, to decide whether a contract permits class arbitration. . . . In fact, however, only the plurality decided that question. But we need not revisit that question here because the parties’ supplemental agreement expressly assigned this issue to the arbitration panel, and no party argues that this assignment was impermissible.”)

114 Id. (“Unfortunately, however, both the parties and the arbitration panel seem to have misunderstood Bazzle in another respect, namely, that it established the standard to be applied by a decision maker in determining whether a contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class arbitration.”)

115 Id. at 1771.
term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”

In *Stolt-Nielsen*, the majority of the Court signaled that *Bazzle* should no longer be read to encourage class arbitrations. In addition, the Court’s majority opinion, in arriving at its conclusion that parties must agree specifically to class arbitration, emphasized the fundamental differences between traditional arbitration and class arbitration. Thus, the majority reminded us, the typical arbitration is a relatively simple proceeding. Even when the subject matter of the dispute is complex, the task of the arbitrator is to resolve a single dispute that adjudicates the rights of a few identified parties who appear before the forum. In contrast, in a class arbitration, there is additional complexity because the arbitrator seeks to resolve many disputes that involve the adjudication of the rights of numerous parties, most of whom are absent from the proceeding. The Court made this point most explicitly when it compared and contrasted class arbitration and class action litigation: “the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, … even though the scope of judicial review is much more limited….” In short, there should be certainty that parties have agreed to a method of dispute resolution that appears ill-suited to their needs.

In addition, the Court highlighted two important issues that call into question the appropriateness of a private contractual justice system: protecting the interests of absent

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116 Id. at 1775.
117 See SI Strong, *Opening More Doors Than It Closes*, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 565, 568 (2010) (describing the opinion as signaling that the court may be cutting back its pro-arbitration precedent and as “extremely troubling”).
118 *Stolt-Nielsen*, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
119 The Stolt-Nielsen majority emphasized that the agreement at issue involved arms-length bargaining among sophisticated parties, at least leaving open the possibility of distinguishing situations like *Concepcion* that involve consumer class arbitrations. See id. at 1775.
parties and providing meaningful review of an arbitration award that has significant consequences for the parties, including absent class members.\textsuperscript{120}

The Supreme Court returned to the differences between bilateral and class arbitration in \textit{AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion}\textsuperscript{121} and held that the FAA preempted California law that disallowed class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. Under California’s \textit{Discover Bank} rule, a waiver found in a consumer contract of adhesion, “in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,” acts to exempt the responsible party from liability and is therefore unconscionable under California law.\textsuperscript{122} Although the \textit{Discover Bank} rule applied to the waivers of all class claims (judicial and arbitration), a majority of the Justices\textsuperscript{123} found that it was “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives:”\textsuperscript{124}

The overarching purpose of the FAA … is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.\textsuperscript{125}

As did Justice Alito in \textit{Stolt-Nielsen}, Justice Scalia enumerated the differences between bilateral and class arbitration to support his conclusion that “class arbitration, to the

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id.} at 1776.
\textsuperscript{121} 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Discover Bank v. Superior Court}, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005).
\textsuperscript{123} Justice Thomas reluctantly joined the majority and wrote a concurring opinion founded on statutory interpretation of FAA §§ 2, 4. \textit{Concepcion}, 131 S. Ct. at 1753-56 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. \textit{Id.} at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id.} at 1753.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Id.} at 1748.
extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”  

In class arbitration, the traditional advantages of arbitration – informality, low cost, and speed – are lost because of the need of procedures to deal with class certification issues and protection of absent class members.  

In particular, he emphasized the increased risks to defendants presented by class arbitration, where “high stakes” combined with minimal judicial review may work to pressure defendants into settling claims of questionable merit. For these reasons, 

We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.  

Although Concepcion considered class action waivers in the context of consumer arbitration contracts, the majority’s opinion does not suggest any inclination to limit its holding to that category of contract. Accordingly, Concepcion provides an incentive for publicly traded issuers that wish to eliminate securities class actions seriously to consider amending their governance documents to include an arbitration provision with a class action waiver.

V. Legality of Class Action Waivers in Securities Class Actions

Suppose a publicly traded domestic issuer adopts an arbitration provision with a class action waiver. A class action waiver with respect to securities class actions raises two additional possible challenges to its validity: (1) it may be unenforceable because it is unconscionable under the FAA; (2) it may be unenforceable, with respect to federal

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126 Id. at 1751.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 1752.  
129 Id.  

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securities class claims, because it violates the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws. Before we examine the legal arguments, we need to consider the impact of a class action waiver on investors.

Institutional investors would likely not experience a serious diminishment of their remedies, since they would be able to bring individual securities actions in the arbitration forum so long as their losses were large enough to make it cost-effective. Some institutional investors, in fact, have recently opted out of class actions to pursue their own remedies when they have a sufficient amount at stake. Requiring them to bring their actions in a commercial arbitration forum (such as AAA) is not likely to present any difficulties that experienced litigators could not adjust to; as we noted above, there have been federal securities claims filed in the AAA forum.

For other investors, particularly small retail investors, however, it is a different story. Their claims will not be sufficiently large to make it economically feasible to bring individual arbitration claims. The costs of proving a federal securities fraud claim – including falsity, materiality, efficient market, scienter, causation and damages -- are generally so large as to make pursuing individual claims infeasible for small retail investors. The only chance for compensation for their losses will be if the SEC, or another regulator, brings an enforcement action against the issuer, obtains a monetary

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130 See supra note and accompanying text. State law may similarly restrict, on public policy grounds, limitations on liability; see, e.g., Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding that public policy does not permit a contractual provision to limit the remedy in the case of intentional misrepresentations).

131 An important issue is what the effect of an arbitration provision in the issuer’s governance documents would have on potential third-party defendants, such as accountants and underwriters. See Thompson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Association, 64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995) (setting forth various contract and agency theories for requiring non-signatories to arbitrate).


133 See supra notes XX86-93 (Harvard v. Surgut). In fact the plaintiffs in Harvard voluntarily brought this as an arb; they could have gone to federal district court. Id. at para. 48.

recovery and establishes a fund to compensate investors. In instances where a regulator does not pursue actions against issuers, small investors will not be compensated for their losses. Will the lack of an available remedy cause courts to strike down a class arbitration waiver under the FAA or federal securities laws?

In its 2000 opinion, *Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph*, the Supreme Court stated that “it may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant … from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.” The Second Circuit has been in the forefront of finding class action waivers unconscionable under the FAA for this reason. In its first opinion in *In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation*, the Second Circuit held that the class action waiver clause was unenforceable because it would effectively preclude individual plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights under federal antitrust law. Plaintiffs were able to prevail because of a financial consulting firm’s affidavit that concluded that “it would not be worthwhile” for a plaintiff to pursue an individual claim in light of the high costs of maintaining the litigation and the small amount of individual damages. Accordingly, the court agreed with plaintiffs that the class action waiver “flatly ensures that no small merchant may challenge American Express’s tying arrangements under the federal antitrust laws,” a troubling outcome because “private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for

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135 For description of the SEC’s authority to establish Fair Funds for investor compensation, see Barbara Black, *Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?*, 63 BUS. LAW. 371(2008).
137 *Id.* at 90.
138 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), *vacated sub nom.* Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). For further discussion of this case, see Black, supra note XX [under the radar], at 834-35.
139 *Id.* at 304.
140 *Id.* at 317.
141 *Id.* at 319.
enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.” Defendants sought certiorari before the Supreme Court, which granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen.

In its opinion on remand, which was decided prior to Concepcion, the Second Circuit affirmed its earlier decision, essentially finding that Stolt-Nielsen was not relevant:

While Stolt-Nielsen plainly rejects using public policy as a means for divining the parties’ intent, nothing in Stolt-Nielsen bars a court from using public policy to find contractual language void. We agree with plaintiffs that “[t]o infer from Stolt-Nielsen’s narrow ruling on contractual construction that the Supreme Court meant to imply that an arbitration is valid and enforceable where, as a demonstrated factual matter, it prevents the effective vindication of federal rights would be to presume that the Stolt-Nielsen court meant to overrule or drastically limit its prior precedent.”

Some commentators hold out the hope that this holding can stand post-Concepcion. It is possible to distinguish Concepcion on legal grounds, since the Supreme Court’s majority found that the FAA preempts a state law finding a class action waiver unconscionable and did not address unconscionability as a question of substantive arbitration law. Moreover, Concepcion can be factually distinguished, since AT&T had,

142 Id.
143 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
144 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011).
145 Id. at 199. See also Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46995 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2011) (denying employer’s motion to compel arbitration because a former employee’s discrimination claims could not be vindicated in individual arbitration).
146 See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (2012) (arguing that Concepcion deals only with state law preemption issues and leaves courts free to strike class action waivers on other grounds).
in fact, provided an attractive arbitration remedy for individual consumers so that they were not in fact left without a remedy.\footnote{Any arbitration would be conducted in the county where the customer was billed, and, for small claims, customers could choose to conduct arbitration personally, telephonically, or just through submissions. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). AT&T would pay all costs for non-frivolous claims, could not seek reimbursement of its attorney fees, and was subject to punitive damages. Id. If an arbitration award was granted greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer, AT&T was required to pay a minimum recovery of $7,500 plus double attorney’s fees. Id.} Nevertheless, the tenor of the majority’s opinion in Concepcion does not suggest that those justices would be amenable to narrowing its holding.

The argument that a securities class action waiver violates the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws because of the loss of the individual investors’ private remedy is stronger. As the McMahon majority stated, Exchange Act § 29(a) “is concerned with whether the agreement ‘weakens [customers’] ability to recover under the Exchange Act.’”\footnote{482 U.S. at 230 (quoting Wilko).} It is well-established that § 29(a) does not permit provisions that weaken investors’ ability to recover under the federal securities laws, no matter what form they take.\footnote{See, e.g., Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 545 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (release in stock purchase agreement), AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003) (non-reliance clause in stock purchase agreement), McMahon & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) (no-action clause in indenture), Anglo-German Progressive Fund, Ltd. v. Concorde Group, Inc., 2010 WL 3911490 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010) (merger clause), Citibank v. Itochu Int’l, Inc., 2003 WL 1797847 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (clause specifying indemnification as sole remedy), Special Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Balto, 325 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Minn. 1971) (clause providing for alternative remedy),} The high costs of pursuing federal securities claims means that, unless a classwide remedy is available, there is, as a practical matter, no remedy for investors with small holdings. A class action waiver in this context is the equivalent of a waiver of investor protections prohibited by the anti-waiver provisions.

To counter this argument, opponents of the federal securities class actions assert that they serve poorly the compensatory function and therefore the individual investors
would not lose anything of significance. Moreover, in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court suggested that it agreed with business interests that the power of regulators to recover funds for the compensation of fraud victims provided an adequate opportunity for compensation. To the extent that courts doubt the compensatory function of class actions, the policy argument based on the anti-waiver provisions is less compelling.

Ironically, the best argument for those advocating the importance of the federal securities class action is the PSLRA, legislation that came about largely through the lobbying efforts of the business community. Business interests urged Congress to eliminate the FOTM presumption, without which securities fraud class actions would be difficult if not impossible to maintain. Instead, PSLRA sought to weed out frivolous suits through a variety of procedural and other measures. In choosing to cure, but not to eliminate the securities class action, Congress determined that a collective-action remedy is necessary for investor protection, especially retail investors. In the PSLRA Congress thus confirmed the importance of the federal securities class action to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.

VI. Conclusion

As this article has explained, post-Concepcion, publicly traded domestic issuers have good reason to consider seriously adoption of an arbitration provision, with a class-

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150 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay in Deterrence and its Implications, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1545 (stating that “from a compensatory perspective, the conclusion seems inescapable that the securities class action performs poorly.”).
153 For a brief description of the key provisions, see Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter & Margaret V. Sachs, Securities Litigation and Enforcement Cases and Materials 9-10 (2d ed. 2008).
action waiver, in their governance documents. While there is considerable uncertainty about the legality and enforceability of such a provision, an issuer may well consider the potential benefits worth fighting for.

What are the implications if issuers prove successful in replacing securities class actions with individual arbitrations? It is worth remembering that there is a fundamental difference between arbitration and litigation. Arbitration is a contractual private system of justice, where the arbitrators are selected by the parties for the sole purpose of deciding the dispute before them. Their charge is to meet their contractual responsibilities to the parties.\textsuperscript{155} Litigation, in contrast, takes place in a government forum, before government officials with a responsibility to look out for the public interest. Securities class actions, in particular, are paradigms of complex civil litigation where the structure and formality of a judicial proceeding are important. Judges’ responsibilities include managing the litigation, including, in the case of class actions, looking out for the interests of absent class members, coordinating with related proceedings in other jurisdictions,\textsuperscript{156} conducting the proceedings in an open forum,\textsuperscript{157} and reviewing settlements to assure they are in the public interest and protect absent class members.\textsuperscript{158} Another important responsibility of the judiciary is to interpret law and to develop principles, such as fiduciary duty and investor protection principles, that will set standards for appropriate conduct on the part of corporate managers and deter inappropriate conduct.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{157} Id.
\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 17-18.
In addition, with respect to federal securities class actions, the significant procedural advantages under PSLRA that Congress constructed for defendants, in order to achieve the twin goals “to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation while preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims,”\(^{160}\) are not readily transferable to the arbitration forum.\(^{161}\) In securities class actions, there is a need for formality and transparency in order to meet the goals of the participants and the national interest. Adjudications, unlike arbitrations, fulfill functions of deterrence and development of legal standards and satisfy investors’ right to know the laws are being enforced.

Accordingly, the enforceability of an arbitration provision in governance documents, although raising interesting and complex legal questions, is really the secondary issue. The overarching policy issue is the future of the securities class actions. Respected academics have previously called for the SEC to take an active role in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the federal securities class action.\(^{162}\) There have been similar calls for reform of state securities class actions.\(^{163}\) Currently there are numerous securities class actions working their way through the judicial system in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.\(^{164}\) In short, the time is right for a re-examination of the costs and benefits of securities class actions.

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\(^{160}\) See supra note  and accompanying text.

\(^{161}\) Indeed, the extent to which arbitrators must apply the law is unclear. See generally Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2002).

